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REACTIVE LEARNING STRATEGIES FOR ITERATED GAMES
ALEX MCAVOY AND MARTIN A. NOWAK
Abstract. In an iterated game between two players, there is much interest in characterizing the set of feasible
payoffs for both players when one player uses a fixed strategy and the other player is free to switch. Such
characterizations have led to extortionists, equalizers, partners, and rivals. Most of those studies use memory-
one strategies, which specify the probabilities to take actions depending on the outcome of the previous round.
Here, we consider “reactive learning strategies,” which gradually modify their propensity to take certain actions
based on past actions of the opponent. Every linear reactive learning strategy, p∗, corresponds to a memory
one-strategy, p, and vice versa. We prove that for evaluating the region of feasible payoffs against a memory-one
strategy, C (p), we need to check its performance against at most 11 other strategies. Thus, C (p) is the convex
hull in R2 of at most 11 points. Furthermore, if p is a memory-one strategy, with feasible payoff region C (p),
and p∗ is the corresponding reactive learning strategy, with feasible payoff region C (p∗), then C (p∗) is a subset
of C (p). Reactive learning strategies are therefore powerful tools in restricting the outcomes of iterated games.
Keywords: adaptive strategy; iterated game; memory-one strategy; social dilemma
1. Introduction
Since the discovery of zero-determinant strategies for iterated games by Press and Dyson [1], there has
been a growing interest in the set of possible payoffs that can be achieved against a fixed strategy. Imagine
that Alice uses a particular strategy, while Bob can try out any conceivable strategy. The resulting set of
payoffs for both Alice and Bob define the “feasible region” of Alice’s strategy. If Alice uses a so-called
zero-determinant strategy [1], then the feasible region is a line. In general, the feasible region is a two-
dimensional convex subset of the feasible payoff region of the game (Fig. 1). Using the geometric intuition
put forth by Press and Dyson [1], subsequent work has explored strategies that generate two-dimensional
feasible regions, defined by linear inequalities rather than strict equations [2–4]. However, a general
description of what this region looks like, as it relates to the type of strategy played, is currently not well-
understood. In this study, we characterize the feasible regions for the well-known class of memory-one
strategies [5] and consider their relationships to those of a new class of “reactive learning strategies.”
Iterated games have many applications across the social sciences and biology, and with them has come
a proliferation of strategy classes of various complexities [6–10]. The type of strategy a player uses for
dealing with repeated encounters depends on many factors, including the cognitive capacity of the player
and the nature of the underlying “one-shot” (or “stage”) games. In applications to theoretical biology, the
most well-studied type of strategy is known as “memory-one” because it takes into account the outcome
of only the previous encounter when determining how to play in the next round [5, 11]. This class of
strategies, while forming only a small subset of all possible ways to play an iterated game [12], has
several advantages over more complicated strategies. They permit rich behavior in iterated play, such as
punishment for exploitation and reward for cooperation [5, 13–18]; but, owing to their simple memory
requirements, they are also straightforward to implement in practice and analyze mathematically.
Memory, however, can apply to more than just the players’ actions in the previous round. Since the
action a player chooses in any particular encounter is typically chosen stochastically rather than determin-
istically, a player can also take into account how they chose their previous action rather than just the result.
In a social dilemma, for instance, each player chooses an action (“cooperate,” C, or “defect,” D) in a given
round and receives a payoff for this action against that of the opponent. The distribution with which this
action is chosen is referred to as a “mixed action” and can be specified by a single number between 0
and 1, representing the tendency to cooperate. A standard memory-one strategy for player X is given by
a five-tuple, (p0, pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD), where p0 is the probability of cooperation in the initial round and
pxy is the probability of cooperation following an outcome in which X uses action x and the opponent,
Y, uses action y. We consider a variation on this theme, where instead of using x and y to determine the
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next mixed action, X uses the opponent’s action, y, to update their own mixed action, σX ∈ [0, 1], that was
used previously to generate x. We refer to a strategy of this form as a “reactive learning strategy.”
Such a strategy is “reactive” because it takes into account the realized action of just the opponent, and
it is “learning” because it adapts to this external stimulus. Like a memory-one strategy, a reactive learning
strategy for X requires knowledge of information one round into the past, namely X’s mixed action, σX ,
and Y’s realized action, y. Unlike a memory-one strategy, in which the probability of cooperation is in the
set {p0, pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD} in every round of the game, a reactive learning strategy can result in a broad
range of cooperation tendencies for X over the duration of an iterated game. Moreover, these tendencies
can be gradually changed over the course of many rounds, resulting (for example) in high probabilities
of cooperation only after the opponent has demonstrated a sufficiently long history of cooperating. Pun-
ishment for defection can be similarly realized over a number of interactions. Remembering a probability,
σX , and an action, y, instead of just two actions, x and y, can thus lead to more complex behaviors.
This adaptive approach to iterated games is similar to the Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning algo-
rithm [19–21], but there are important distinctions. For one, a reactive learning strategy does not necessar-
ily reinforce behavior resulting in higher payoffs. Furthermore, it completely disregards the focal player’s
realized action, using only that of the opponent in the update mechanism. But there are certainly reactive
learning strategies that are more closely related to reinforcement learning, and we give an example using
a variation on the memory-one strategy tit-for-tat (TFT), which we call “learning tit-for-tat (LTFT).”
In this study, we establish some basic properties of reactive learning strategies relative to the memory-
one space. We first characterize the feasible region of a memory-one strategy as the convex hull of at most
11 points. When then show that there is an embedding of the set of memory-one strategies in the set
of reactive learning strategies with the following property: if p is a memory-one strategy and p∗ is the
corresponding reactive learning strategy, then the feasible region of p contains the feasible region of p∗.
Moreover, the image of the map p 7→ p∗ is the set of linear reactive learning strategies, which consists of
those strategies that send a player’s mixed action, σX , to ασX + β for some α, β ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence,
if the goal of a player is to restrict the region of payoffs attainable by the players, then this player should
prefer using a linear reactive learning strategy over the corresponding memory-one strategy.
2. Memory-one strategies
Consider an iterated game between two players, X and Y. In every round, each player chooses an action
from the set {C, D} (“cooperate” or “defect”). They receive payoffs based on the values in the matrix
( C D
C R S
D T P
)
. (1)
Over many rounds, these payoffs are averaged to arrive at an expected payoff for each player.
Whereas an action specifies the behavior of a player in one particular encounter, a strategy specifies
how a player behaves over the course of many encounters. One of the simplest and best-studied strategies
for iterated games is a memory-one strategy [5], which for player X is defined as follows: for every
(x, y) ∈ {C, D}2 observed as action outcomes of a given round, X devises a mixed action pxy ∈ [0, 1]
for the next round. The notation pxy indicates that this mixed action depends on the (pure) actions of
both players in the previous round, not how they arrived at those actions (e.g. by generating an action
probabilistically). The term “strategy” is reserved for the players’ behaviors in the iterated game.
Let Mem1X be the space of all memory-one strategies for player X in an iterated game. With just two
actions, C and D, we have Mem1X = [0, 1]× [0, 1]4, i.e. the space of all (p0, pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) ∈ [0, 1]5. A
pair of memory-one strategies, p := (p0, pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) and q := (q0, qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD), for X and
2
Y, respectively, yield a Markov chain on the space of all action pairs, {C, D}2, whose transition matrix is
M (p,q) =

CC CD DC DD
CC pCCqCC pCC (1− qCC) (1− pCC) qCC (1− pCC) (1− qCC)
CD pCDqDC pCD (1− qDC) (1− pCD) qDC (1− pCD) (1− qDC)
DC pDCqCD pDC (1− qCD) (1− pDC) qCD (1− pDC) (1− qCD)
DD pDDqDD pDD (1− qDD) (1− pDD) qDD (1− pDD) (1− qDD)
 (2)
and whose initial distribution is µ0 := (p0q0, p0 (1− q0) , (1− p0) q0, (1− p0) (1− q0)). If pxy, qxy ∈ (0, 1)
for every x, y ∈ {C, D}, then this chain is ergodic and has a unique stationary distribution, µ (p,q),
which is independent of µ0. In particular, the expected payoffs, piX (p,q) = µ (p,q) · (R, S, T, P) and
piY (p,q) = µ (p,q) · (R, T, S, P), are independent of p0 and q0. In this case, piX and piY are functions of
just the response probabilities, p•• := (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) and q•• := (qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD).
A useful way of thinking about a strategy is through its feasible region, i.e. the set of all possible payoff
pairs (for X and Y) that can be achieved against it. For any memory-one strategy p of X, let
C (p) := {(piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q))}q∈Mem1X (3)
be this feasible region. (Note that, if X uses a memory-one strategy, then it suffices to assume that Y uses
a memory-one strategy by the results of Press and Dyson [1].) This subset of the feasible region represents
the “geometry” of strategy p in the sense that it captures all possible payoff pairs against an opponent.
In this section, we show that the feasible region for p ∈ Mem1X with p•• ∈ (0, 1)4 is characterized
by playing p against the following 11 strategies: (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0, 1),
(0, 1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1, 1), and (1, 1, 1, 1). In other words, C (p) is the convex
hull of 11 points (see Fig. 1). Therefore, any p ∈Mem1X generates a simple polygon in R2 whose number
of extreme points is uniformly bounded over all game-strategy pairs, ((R, S, T, P) ,p).
Lemma 1. For q ∈Mem1X and x, y ∈ {C, D}, let
(
q; qxy = q′xy
)
be the strategy obtained from q by chang-
ing qxy to q′xy ∈ [0, 1]. If p•• ∈ (0, 1)4, q ∈ Mem1X , and x, y ∈ {C, D}, then the point (piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q))
falls on the line joining
(
piY
(
p,
(
q; qxy = 0
))
,piX
(
p,
(
q; qxy = 0
)))
and
(
piY
(
p,
(
q; qxy = 1
))
,piX
(
p,
(
q; qxy = 1
)))
.
Proof. Let p•• ∈ (0, 1)4 and q ∈ Mem1X . Since the transition matrix of Eq. 2 is just 4 × 4, one can
directly solve for its stationary distribution, µ (p,q) (e.g. by using Gaussian elimination or the determinant
formula of Press and Dyson [1]). For example, suppose that x = y = C. Then, with
L (qCC) :=
(1− qCC)
1+ qCC

pCC−pCC pCD+pCC pDD−pCCqCD+pCCqDD+pDCqCD−pDDqDD+pCC pCDqCD−pCC pCDqDD−pCC pDDqCD−pCD pDCqCD−pCC pDCqDC+pCC pDCqDD
+pCC pDDqDC+pCD pDCqDC−pCD pDDqDC+pDC pDDqCD+pCD pDDqDD−pDC pDDqDD
pDD−pCD−qCD+qDD+pCDqCD+pCDqDC+pDCqCD−pCDqDD−pDDqCD−pDCqDC+pDCqDD+pDDqDC−pDDqDD−pCC pCDqDC−pCD pDCqCD+pCD pDCqDC
+pCC pDDqDD+pDC pDDqCD−pDC pDDqDD−pCDqCDqDC+pDCqCDqDC+pCDqDCqDD−pDDqDCqDD+pCC pCDqCDqDC−pCC pDCqCDqDC−pCC pCDqDCqDD+pCC pDCqCDqDD−pCC pDDqCDqDD−pCD pDCqCDqDD−pCD pDDqCDqDC+pCD pDDqCDqDD
+pCC pDDqDCqDD+pCD pDCqDCqDD+pDC pDDqCDqDC−pDC pDDqDCqDD+1

, (4)
one has
(piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q)) = L (qCC) (piY (p, (q; qCC = 0)) ,piX (p, (q; qCC = 0)))
+ (1− L (qCC)) (piY (p, (q; qCC = 1)) ,piX (p, (q; qCC = 1))) . (5)
Provided (piY (p, (q; qCC = 0)) ,piX (p, (q; qCC = 0))) 6= (piY (p, (q; qCC = 1)) ,piX (p, (q; qCC = 1))), we also
have L (0) = 1 and L (1) = 0. Moreover, one can check that, under this condition, L′ (qCC) is nowhere equal
to 0, and 0 6 L (qCC) 6 1 for every qCC ∈ [0, 1]. The other cases with x, y ∈ {C, D} are analogous. 
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Figure 1. Feasible region (grey) for a strategy with p•• = (0.7881, 0.8888, 0.4686, 0.0792) when
R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1. The light blue region depicts the set of all payoff pairs that
can be achieved in the iterated game, i.e. the convex hull of the points (R, R), (S, T), (P, P), and
(T, S). The feasible region of p can be characterized as the convex hull of 11 points, corresponding
to those opponent-strategies, q, appearing next to each black dot. In this instance, five of these
points already fall inside of the convex hull of the remaining six. However, one cannot remove one
of these 11 points without destroying this characterization for some game-strategy pair.
Remark 1. Even when qxy is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the corresponding points in the
feasible region need not be uniformly distributed between the endpoints corresponding to qxy = 0 and
qxy = 1, respectively (see Fig. 2). This result is therefore somewhat different from the analogous situation
of playing against a mixed action in a stage game, where, for a payoff function u : SX × SY → R2 and
mixed action σX ∈ ∆ (SX) and σY ∈ ∆ (SY), one has u (σX , σY) =
∫
y∈SY u (σX , y) dσY (y) due to linearity.
Proposition 1. For any p ∈ Mem1X with p•• ∈ (0, 1)4, C (p) is the convex hull of the following 11 points:(
pi
(0,0,0,0)
X
pi
(0,0,0,0)
Y
)
=
( P−PpCD+SpDD
pDD−pCD+1
P−PpCD+TpDD
pDD−pCD+1
)
; (6a)
(
pi
(0,0,0,1)
X
pi
(0,0,0,1)
Y
)
=
( P+T−PpCD+RpDD+SpDC−TpCD−TpDD−RpCD pDD+SpCC pDD−SpDC pDD+TpCD pDD
pDC−2pCD+pCC pDD−pDC pDD+2
P+S−PpCD+RpDD−SpCD−SpDD+TpDC−RpCD pDD+SpCD pDD+TpCC pDD−TpDC pDD
pDC−2pCD+pCC pDD−pDC pDD+2
)
; (6b)
(
pi
(0,0,1,0)
X
pi
(0,0,1,0)
Y
)
=
( P−PpDC+SpDD+TpDD−PpCC pCD+PpCD pDC+RpCD pDD−TpCD pDD
2pDD−pDC−pCC pCD+pCD pDC+1
P−PpDC+SpDD+TpDD−PpCC pCD+PpCD pDC+RpCD pDD−SpCD pDD
2pDD−pDC−pCC pCD+pCD pDC+1
)
; (6c)
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Figure 2. The set of points (piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q)), where p•• = (0.7876, 0.9856, 0.4095, 0.0301) and
q•• = (qCC, 0.9963, 0.0166, 0.9879) as qCC varies between 0 (green) and 1 (red) in uniform increments
of 0.01. The resulting points all fall along a line; however, they are not uniformly distributed even
though the distribution of qCC is uniform. Parameters: R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1.
(
pi
(0,0,1,1)
X
pi
(0,0,1,1)
Y
)
=

P+T−PpDC+RpDD+SpDC−TpDD−PpCC pCD+PpCD pDC+RpCD pDC−RpDC pDD+SpCC pDD−SpDC pDD−TpCC pCD+TpCC pDD
2(pCC pDD−pCC pCD+pCD pDC−pDC pDD+1)
P+S−PpDC+RpDD−SpDD+TpDC−PpCC pCD+PpCD pDC+RpCD pDC−RpDC pDD−SpCC pCD+SpCC pDD+TpCC pDD−TpDC pDD
2(pCC pDD−pCC pCD+pCD pDC−pDC pDD+1)
 ; (6d)
(
pi
(0,1,0,1)
X
pi
(0,1,0,1)
Y
)
=
( T+PpDC+RpDC−TpCD−TpDD−PpCD pDC−RpCD pDC+SpCC pDC+TpCD pDD
2pDC−pCD−pDD+pCC pDC−2pCD pDC+pCD pDD+1
S+PpDC+RpDC−SpCD−SpDD−PpCD pDC−RpCD pDC+SpCD pDD+TpCC pDC
2pDC−pCD−pDD+pCC pDC−2pCD pDC+pCD pDD+1
)
; (6e)
(
pi
(0,1,1,0)
X
pi
(0,1,1,0)
Y
)
=
( PpDC+TpDD−PpCC pDC+RpDC pDD+SpDC pDD−TpCD pDD
pDC+pDD−pCC pDC−pCD pDD+2pDC pDD
PpDC+SpDD−PpCC pDC+RpDC pDD−SpCD pDD+TpDC pDD
pDC+pDD−pCC pDC−pCD pDD+2pDC pDD
)
; (6f)
(
pi
(0,1,1,1)
X
pi
(0,1,1,1)
Y
)
=
( T+PpDC+RpDC−TpDD−PpCC pDC+SpCC pDC−TpCC pCD+TpCC pDD
2pDC−pDD−pCC pCD+pCC pDD+1
S+PpDC+RpDC−SpDD−PpCC pDC−SpCC pCD+SpCC pDD+TpCC pDC
2pDC−pDD−pCC pCD+pCC pDD+1
)
; (6g)
(
pi
(1,0,0,1)
X
pi
(1,0,0,1)
Y
)
=
(
− P+T−PpCC−PpCD+RpDD+SpDC−TpCC−TpCD+PpCC pCD−RpCD pDD−SpCC pDC+TpCC pCD2pCC+2pCD−pDC−pDD−2pCC pCD+pCC pDC+pCD pDD−2
− P+S−PpCC−PpCD+RpDD−SpCC−SpCD+TpDC+PpCC pCD−RpCD pDD+SpCC pCD−TpCC pDC2pCC+2pCD−pDC−pDD−2pCC pCD+pCC pDC+pCD pDD−2
)
; (6h)
(
pi
(1,0,1,0)
X
pi
(1,0,1,0)
Y
)
=
( P−PpCC−PpDC+SpDD+TpDD+PpCC pDC+RpCD pDD−SpCC pDD−TpCC pDD
2pDD−pDC−pCC+pCC pDC−2pCC pDD+pCD pDD+1
P−PpCC−PpDC+SpDD+TpDD+PpCC pDC+RpCD pDD−SpCC pDD−TpCC pDD
2pDD−pDC−pCC+pCC pDC−2pCC pDD+pCD pDD+1
)
; (6i)
5
(
pi
(1,0,1,1)
X
pi
(1,0,1,1)
Y
)
=
( P+T−PpCC−PpDC+RpDD+SpDC−TpCC+PpCC pDC+RpCD pDC−RpDC pDD−SpCC pDC
pDD−2pCC+pCD pDC−pDC pDD+2
P+S−PpCC−PpDC+RpDD−SpCC+TpDC+PpCC pDC+RpCD pDC−RpDC pDD−TpCC pDC
pDD−2pCC+pCD pDC−pDC pDD+2
)
; (6j)
(
pi
(1,1,1,1)
X
pi
(1,1,1,1)
Y
)
=
( T+RpDC−TpCC
pDC−pCC+1
S+RpDC−SpCC
pDC−pCC+1
)
. (6k)
Proof. Press and Dyson [1] show that if X uses a memory-one strategy, p, then any strategy of the oppo-
nent, y, can be replaced by a memory-one strategy, q, without changing the payoffs to X and Y; thus, if X
uses a memory-one strategy, one may assume without a loss of generality that Y also uses a memory-one
strategy. If p•• ∈ (0, 1)4 and q ∈ Mem1X , the fact that (piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q)) can be written as a convex
combination of the 16 points {(piY (p,q′) ,piX (p,q′))}q′••∈{0,1}4 then follows immediately from Lemma 1.
Moreover, the points corresponding to (0, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0), and (1, 0, 0, 0) are the same, as are the points
corresponding to (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0), and (1, 1, 1, 1); thus, we can eliminate four points. Furthermore, we
can remove the point associated to (1, 1, 0, 0) because it lies on the line connecting the points associated to
(0, 0, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1, 1). One can easily check that the remaining 11 points have the following property: if
point i is removed, then there exist R, S, T, P and p for which C (p) is not the convex hull of the 10 points
different from i (Table 1). Thus, for a general p and payoff matrix, all 11 of these points are required. 
Remark 2. p enforces a linear payoff relationship if and only if these 11 points are collinear.
Remark 3. One needs all 11 of these points for general R, S, T, P and p. However, for any particular
game-strategy pair, it is often the case that several of these points are unnecessary because they lie within
the convex hull of some other subset of these 11 points; they are typically not all extreme points of C (p).
3. Reactive learning strategies
In a traditional memory-one strategy, X’s probability of playing C depends on the realized actions of
the two players, x and y. However, X can observe more than just their pure action against the opponent’s;
they also know how they arrived at x (i.e. they know the mixed action, σX , that resulted in x in the
previous round). Of course, X need not be able to see Y’s mixed action, but they can still observe the pure
action Y played. Therefore, an alternative notion of a memory-one strategy for player X could be defined
as follows: after X plays σX ∈ [0, 1] and Y plays y, X then chooses a new action based on the distribution
p∗σXy ∈ [0, 1]. In this formulation, p∗ is a map from [0, 1]× {C, D} to [0, 1]. We refer to such a map, p∗,
together with X’s initial probability of playing C, p0, as a “reactive learning strategy” for player X (Fig. 3).
In other words, in contrast to Mem1X = [0, 1]× [0, 1]4, which can be alternatively described as
Mem1X = [0, 1]×
{
p : {C, D} × {C, D} → [0, 1]
}
, (7)
we define the space of reactive learning strategies as
RLX := [0, 1]×
{
p∗ : [0, 1]× {C, D} → [0, 1]
}
, (8)
where [0, 1] indicates the space of mixed actions for X and {C, D} indicates the action space for Y. Al-
though [0, 1] is a much larger space than {C, D}, the updates of mixed actions can be easier to specify
using reactive learning strategies since they allow for adaptive modification of an existing mixed action
(without the need to devise a new mixed action from scratch after every observed history of play).
Example 1. Suppose that player X starts by playing C and D with equal probability, i.e. p0 = 1/2.
For fixed η ∈ [0, 1] (the “learning rate”), cooperation from the opponent leads to p∗σXC = (1− η) σX + η
while defection leads to p∗σX D = (1− η) σX . Thus, a long pattern of exploitation by Y leads X to defect
more often. On the other hand, X does not immediately forgive such behavior but rather requires Y to
cooperate repeatedly to bring X back up to higher levels of cooperation. For example, if X starts with p0
and Y defects ` times in a row, then X subsequently cooperates with probability (1− η)` p0. In order to
6
point
(
R S
T P
)
p••
pi
(0,0,0,0)
X,Y
(
4.5953 −3.5001
−0.1798 4.4972
)
(0.0347, 0.8913, 0.9873, 0.1164)
pi
(0,0,0,1)
X,Y
(
3.5909 3.7183
3.1091 2.6508
)
(0.3420, 0.5591, 0.0468, 0.9941)
pi
(0,0,1,0)
X,Y
(
0.1150 1.2677
−2.8725 1.4290
)
(0.8937, 0.9211, 0.6995, 0.0052)
pi
(0,0,1,1)
X,Y
(
−0.1523 1.7642
−3.3334 −3.9907
)
(0.5319, 0.4107, 0.9805, 0.0823)
pi
(0,1,0,1)
X,Y
(
2.1084 0.4235
4.5449 −4.5716
)
(0.3897, 0.6428, 0.2422, 0.0300)
pi
(0,1,1,0)
X,Y
(
2.5627 −2.5701
−4.1353 4.0437
)
(0.7502, 0.7603, 0.9999, 0.3161)
pi
(0,1,1,1)
X,Y
(
0.0600 1.1524
2.8660 1.3631
)
(0.1145, 0.9494, 0.7587, 0.9214)
pi
(1,0,0,1)
X,Y
(
−4.4025 1.6813
−2.9162 1.1664
)
(0.9629, 0.0020, 0.2554, 0.8444)
pi
(1,0,1,0)
X,Y
(
0.1167 2.5125
−0.3462 −4.6919
)
(0.4121, 0.4373, 0.5380, 0.8915)
pi
(1,0,1,1)
X,Y
(
−0.3787 1.1357
1.5417 2.7617
)
(0.2570, 0.5191, 0.1293, 0.9332)
pi
(1,1,1,1)
X,Y
(
−1.8211 −3.2300
−4.6281 −0.4609
)
(0.0009, 0.4996, 0.4362, 0.9653)
Table 1. For each point, pi(i1,i2,i3,i3)X,Y , the feasible region C (p) cannot (in general) be ex-
pressed as the convex hull of the remaining 10 points different from pi(i1,i2,i3,i3)X,Y . That is,
each row gives (i) one of the 11 points of which C is the convex hull and (ii) an example
of a game-strategy pair for which pi(i1,i2,i3,i3)X,Y is an extreme point of C (p).
bring X’s probability of cooperation above p0 once again, Y must then cooperate for T rounds, where
T >
log
(
1−p0
1−(1−η)`p0
)
log (1− η) . (9)
We refer to this strategy as “learning tit-for-tat (LTFT)” because it pushes a player’s cooperation probability
in the direction of the opponent’s last move (see Fig. 4). In this way, a reactive learning strategy can
encode more complicated behavior than a memory-one strategy. Conversely, memory-one strategies can
also encode behavior not captured by reactive learning strategies, which we discuss further in §3.3.
3.1. Linear reactive learning strategies. A pertinent question at this point is whether there is a “natural”
map from Mem1X to RLX . Let (p0,p••) = (p0, pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) be a memory-one strategy. If (p′0, p∗) is
the corresponding reactive learning strategy, then the first requirement we impose is p′0 = p0. If σX = 1,
then X plays C with probability one. It is therefore reasonable to insist that p∗1y = pCy. Similarly, X plays
7
reactive
strategies("#, "%)memory-onestrategies("#, "'%)
()*+,
reactive learning
strategies("#, "-.%∗ )
01+
Figure 3. The space of memory-one strategies, Mem1X , as it relates to the space of reactive learning
strategies, RLX . Both sets contain the space of reactive strategies [22], which take into account only
the last move, y, of the opponent. Whereas a memory-one strategy takes into account the last pure
action of X as well, x, a reactive learning strategy uses X’s last mixed action, σX ∈ [0, 1]. After each
round, a reactive learning strategy uses y to update X’s probability of cooperating. RLX is “larger”
than Mem1X in the sense that there is an injective map Mem
1
X → RLX that is not surjective.
!
"#ALLD ALLC
TFT
learning tit-for-tat (LTFT)
0 0 1
1
STFT
Figure 4. “Learning tit-for-tat (LTFT),” an analogue of tit-for-tat (TFT) within the space of reactive
learning strategies. LTFT is the function of two parameters, p0 (the initial mixed action) and η (the
learning rate). Player X initially plays C with probability p0. In all subsequent rounds, if X played
C with probability σX and Y played C (resp. D) in the previous round, in the next round X plays C
with probability p∗σXC = (1− η) σX + η (resp. p∗σX D = (1− η) σX). At the corners lie the strategies
ALLD (always defect), ALLC (always cooperate), TFT (tit-for-tat), and STFT (suspicious tit-for-tat).
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D with probability one when σX = 0, and we insist that p∗0y = pDy. Suppose now that σX and σ′X are two
mixed actions for X. If Y plays y ∈ {C, D}, then the responses for X corresponding to σX and σ′X are p∗σXy
and p∗
σ′Xy
, respectively. If X plays σX with probability w ∈ [0, 1] and σ′X with probability 1− w, then it is
also natural to insist that the response is p∗σXy with probability w and p
∗
σ′Xy
with probability 1− w. Thus,
for any σX ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ {C, D}, with these requirements p∗ can be written uniquely in terms of p•• as
p∗σXy = σX p
∗
1y + (1− σX) p∗0y = σX pCy + (1− σX) pDy. (10)
Using this map, one can naturally identify Mem1X with the set of linear reactive learning strategies, LRLX ⊆
RLX , consisting of those functions p∗ : [0, 1]× {C, D} → [0, 1] for which there exist a, b, c, d ∈ R with
p∗σXC = σXa + (1− σX) c; (11a)
p∗σX D = σXb + (1− σX) d. (11b)
Clearly, any such a, b, c, d must lie in [0, 1] since p∗σXy ∈ [0, 1] for every σX ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ {C, D}.
Under this correspondence, the strategy of Example 1 has parameters (1/2, 1, 1− η, η, 0). But note that
this map, Mem1X → RLX , is not surjective due to the fact that not every reactive learning strategy is linear.
For example, if (a, b, c, d) ∈ [0, 1]4 and p∗ ∈ RLX is the quadratic response function defined by
p∗σXC := (σX)
2 a +
(
1− (σX)2
)
c; (12a)
p∗σX D := (σX)
2 b +
(
1− (σX)2
)
d, (12b)
then there exists no (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) ∈ [0, 1]4 mapping to p∗ provided a 6= c or b 6= d.
3.2. Stationary distributions. Suppose that (p0, p∗) and (q0, q∗) are reactive learning strategies for X and
Y, respectively. These strategies generate a Markov chain on the (infinite) space {C, D}2 × [0, 1]2 with
transition probabilities between
(
(x, y) , (σX , σY)
)
,
(
(x′, y′) ,
(
p∗σXy, q
∗
σY x
) )
∈ {C, D}2 × [0, 1]2 given by
P(
(x,y),(σX ,σY)
)
→
(
(x′ ,y′),(p∗σX y ,q
∗
σY x)
) :=

p∗σXyq
∗
σY x x
′ = C, y′ = C,
p∗σXy
(
1− q∗σY x
)
x′ = C, y′ = D,(
1− p∗σXy
)
q∗σY x x
′ = D, y′ = C,(
1− p∗σXy
) (
1− q∗σY x
)
x′ = D, y′ = D.
(13)
To simplify notation, we can also denote the right-hand side of this equation by p∗σXy (x
′) q∗σY x (y
′).
If ν is a stationary distribution of this chain, then, for any
(
(x, y) , (σX , σY)
)
∈ {C, D}2 × [0, 1]2,
ν
(
(x, y) , (σX , σY)
)
=
∫
(
(x′ ,y′),(σ′X ,σ′Y)
)
(
p∗
σ′X y′
,q∗
σ′Y x′
)
=(σX ,σY)
P(
(x′ ,y′),(σ′X ,σ′Y)
)
→
(
(x,y),(σX ,σY)
) dν( (x′, y′) , (σ′X , σ′Y) )
=
∫
(
(x′ ,y′),(σ′X ,σ′Y)
)
(
p∗
σ′X y′
,q∗
σ′Y x′
)
=(σX ,σY)
σX (x) σY (y) dν
( (
x′, y′
)
,
(
σ′X , σ′Y
) )
. (14)
In general, ν is difficult to give explicitly. However, it is possible to understand the marginal distributions
on σX and σY in more detail (see Appendix). In any case, having an explicit formula for ν is not necessary
for obtaining our main result on feasible payoff regions, which we turn to in the next section.
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3.3. Feasible payoff regions. By looking at the feasible region of a strategy, we uncover a nice relationship
between a memory-one strategy, p, and its corresponding (linear) reactive learning strategy, p∗. Namely,
for every p ∈ Mem1X , we have C (p∗) ⊆ C (p). In this section, we give a proof of this fact and illustrate
some of its consequences.
For t > 1, let Ht =
(
{C, D}2
)t
be the history of play from time 0 through time t − 1 [12]. When
t = 0, H0 = {∅}, where ∅ denotes the “empty” history, indicating that no play came before the present
encounter. A behavioral strategy for a player specifies, for every possible history of play, a probability of
using C in the next encounter. That is, if H := unionsqt>0Ht, then a behavioral strategy is a map H → [0, 1]. The
following lemma shows that when considering the feasible region of a memory-one or reactive learning
strategy, one can assume without a loss of generality that the opponent is playing a Markov strategy:
Lemma 2. LetM⊆ B be the set of all Markov strategies, i.e.
M :=
{
y : {1, 2, . . . } × {C, D}2 → [0, 1]
}
. (15)
For any x ∈Mem1X ∪RLX , we have C (x) = {(piY (x, y) ,piX (x, y))}y∈M.
Proof. When p ∈Mem1X , the lemma follows from [1, Appendix A]. Specifically, when X plays p ∈Mem1X
against y ∈ B, consider the time-t distributions µt on {C, D}2 and µt on Ht. For (xt+1, yt+1) ∈ {C, D}2,
µt+1 (xt+1, yt+1) = ∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
pxtyt (xt+1) yht+1 (yt+1) µt+1 (ht+1)
= ∑
ht+1∈Ht+1
pxtyt (xt+1) y(ht ,(xt ,yt)) (yt+1) µt+1 (ht+1)
= ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
pxtyt (xt+1) ∑
ht∈Ht
y(ht ,(xt ,yt)) (yt+1) µt (xt, yt | ht) µt (ht) . (16)
Therefore, the same sequence of distributions {µt}t>0 arises when Y uses the Markov strategy defined by
qt+1xtyt (yt+1) :=
∑ht∈Ht y(ht ,(xt ,yt)) (yt+1) µt (xt, yt | ht) µt (ht)
∑ht∈Ht µt (xt, yt | ht) µt (ht)
. (17)
If p∗ : [0, 1]× {C, D} → [0, 1] is a reactive learning strategy that X uses against y ∈ B, then for every
t > 0 there are distributions νt on {C, D}2, χt on [0, 1], and νt on Ht × [0, 1]. For (xt+1, yt+1) ∈ {C, D}2,
νt+1 (xt+1, yt+1)
=
∫
(ht+1,σtX)∈Ht+1×[0,1]
p∗
σtXyt
(xt+1) yht+1 (yt+1) dνt+1
(
ht+1, σtX
)
= ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtXyt
(xt+1)
∫
(ht ,σt−1X )∈Ht×[0,1]
y(ht ,(xt ,yt)) (yt+1) dχt
(
σtX | (ht, (xt, yt)) , σt−1X
)
dνt
(
ht, σt−1X
)
. (18)
Consider the Markov strategy for Y with q0 := y∅ and q1x0y0 (y1) := y(x0,y0) (y1). For t > 1, let
qt+1xtyt (yt+1) :=
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtX yt
(xt+1)
∫
(ht ,σt−1X )∈Ht×[0,1]
y(ht ,(xt ,yt))(yt+1) dχt(σ
t
X |(ht ,(xt ,yt)),σt−1X ) dνt(ht ,σt−1X )∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtX yt
(xt+1) dχt(σtX |xt ,yt)νt(xt ,yt)
. (19)
If ν′t and χ′t are the analogues of νt and χt for p∗ against
{
qt
}
t>1, then clearly νt = ν
′
t and χt = χ
′
t for
t = 0, 1. Suppose that for some t > 1, we have νt = ν′t and χt = χ′t. It follows, then, that at time t + 1,
ν′t+1 (xt+1, yt+1) = ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
qt+1xtyt (yt+1)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtXyt
(xt+1) dχ′t
(
σtX | xt, yt
)
ν′t (xt, yt)
= ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
qt+1xtyt (yt+1)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtXyt
(xt+1) dχt
(
σtX | xt, yt
)
νt (xt, yt)
10
= νt+1 (xt+1, yt+1) , (20)
which gives the desired result for x ∈ RLX . 
This lemma leads to a straightforward proof of our main result:
Theorem 1. C (p∗) ⊆ C (p) for every p ∈Mem1X .
Proof. By Lemma 2, for x ∈ RLX , we may assume the opponent’s strategy is Markovian, meaning that it
has a memory of one round into the past but can depend on the current round, t. This dependence on t
distinguishes a Markov strategy from a memory-one strategy, the latter of which also has memory of one
round into the past but is independent of t. We denote byM the set of all Markov strategies (Eq. 15).
Let p∗ be a linear reactive learning strategy for X and suppose that y ∈ M. For every t > 0, these
strategies generate a distribution ν∗t over {C, D}2× [0, 1]. For any strategy q against p, there is a sequence
of distributions µt on {C, D}2 generated by these two strategies. We prove the proposition by finding{
qt
}
t>1 ∈ M such that µt (xt, yt) = ν∗t ({(xt, yt)} × [0, 1]) for every (xt, yt) ∈ {C, D}2 and t > 0.
Let χt be the (marginal) distribution on σtX ∈ [0, 1] at time t. For yt ∈ {C, D}, denote by χt (· | yt) this
distribution conditioned on Y using action yt at time t. For t > 0, consider the strategy with q0 := y∅ and
qt+1Cyt (yt+1) :=
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
σtX
(
σtXy
t+1
Cyt (yt+1) +
(
1− σtX
)
yt+1Dyt (yt+1)
)
dχt
(
σtX | yt
)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
σtX dχt
(
σtX | yt
) ; (21a)
qt+1Dyt (yt+1) :=
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
(
1− σtX
) (
σtXy
t+1
Cyt (yt+1) +
(
1− σtX
)
yt+1Dyt (yt+1)
)
dχt
(
σtX | yt
)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
(
1− σtX
)
dχt
(
σtX | yt
) . (21b)
Clearly, µ0 (x0, y0) = ν∗0 ({(x0, y0)} × [0, 1]) for every (x0, y0) ∈ {C, D}2. Suppose, for some t >, that
µt (xt, yt) = ν∗t ({(xt, yt)} × [0, 1]) for every (xt, yt) ∈ {C, D}2. For (xt+1, yt+1) ∈ {C, D}2, we then have
µt+1 (xt+1, yt+1) = ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
pxtyt (xt+1) q
t+1
xtyt (yt+1) µt (xt, yt)
= ∑
yt∈{C,D}
(
pCyt (xt+1) q
t+1
Cyt (yt+1) µt (C, yt) + pDyt (xt+1) q
t+1
Dyt (yt+1) µt (D, yt)
)
= ∑
yt∈{C,D}
pCyt (xt+1)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
σtX
(
σtXy
t+1
Cyt (yt+1) +
(
1− σtX
)
yt+1Dyt (yt+1)
)
dχt
(
σtX | yt
)
+ ∑
yt∈{C,D}
pDyt (xt+1)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
(
1− σtX
) (
σtXy
t+1
Cyt (yt+1) +
(
1− σtX
)
yt+1Dyt (yt+1)
)
dχt
(
σtX | yt
)
= ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
yt+1xtyt (yt+1)
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
(
σtX pCyt +
(
1− σtX
)
pDyt
)
dν∗t
({(xt, yt)} × {σtX})
= ∑
(xt ,yt)∈{C,D}2
∫
σtX∈[0,1]
p∗
σtXyt
(xt+1) yt+1xtyt (yt+1) dν
∗
t
({(xt, yt)} × {σtX})
= ν∗t+1 ({(xt+1, yt+1)} × [0, 1]) . (22)
Therefore, by induction and the definition of expected payoff in an iterated game, C (p∗) ⊆ C (p). 
As a consequence of Theorem 1, we see that p∗ is a enforces a linear payoff relationship [1] whenever
p does. However, the converse need not hold; Fig. 5(b) gives an example in which X’s payoff is a function
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of Y’s when X uses p∗ but not when X uses p. Although this example illustrates an extreme case of when
the payoff region collapses, perhaps the most interesting behavior is illustrated by Fig. 5(a),(c),(d). In these
examples, we focus on the payoff regions that can be obtained against memory-one opponents. Using p∗
instead of p can both bias payoffs in favor of X and limit potential losses against a spiteful opponent.
For a memory-one strategy p ∈ Mem1X , we can ask how the region {(piY (p,q) ,piX (p,q))}q∈Mem1X
compares to {(piY (p∗,q∗) ,piX (p∗,q∗))}q∈Mem1X . In other words, does the map p 7→ p
∗ transform the
feasible region of a strategy when the opponents are also subjected to this map? Fig. 6 demonstrates that
this map can significantly distort the distribution of payoffs within the feasible region.
3.4. Optimization through mutation. Suppose that X uses a fixed reactive learning strategy, p∗, for some
p ∈ Mem1X . Starting from some random memory-one strategy, q, the opponent might seek to optimize
his or her payoff through a series of mutations. In other words, Y is subjected to the following process:
First, sample a new strategy q′ ∈ Mem1X . If the payoff to Y for q′ against p∗ exceeds that of q against
p∗, switch to q′; otherwise, retain q. This step then repeats until Y has a sufficiently high payoff (or else
has not changed strategies in some fixed number of steps). From Fig. 6, one expects this process to give
different results from the same update scheme when X plays the memory-one strategy p instead of p∗.
As expected, Fig. 7 shows that this optimization process behaves quite differently against p∗ as it does
against p. Whereas using p in this example results in equitable outcomes, using p∗ gives X a much higher
payoff than Y, indicating extortionate behavior. One can also imagine other optimization procedures (not
covered here), such as when q′ is always sufficiently close to q (i.e. local mutations). When X uses p∗,
a path from the red point to the magenta point in Fig. 6 through random local sampling of q typically
requires Y to initially accept lower payoffs. If Y uses q∗ instead of q, as in Fig. 6(b), this effect is amplified.
4. Discussion
Our primary focus has been on the feasible region generated by a fixed strategy. This approach to
studying X’s strategy is inspired by the “zero-determinant” strategies of Press and Dyson [1], which
enforce linear subsets of the feasible region. This perspective has also been expanded to cover so-called
“partner” and “rival” strategies [2–4], which have proven extremely useful in understanding repeated
games from an evolutionary perspective. The feasible region of a memory-one strategy, p, is quite simple
and can be characterized as the convex hull of at most 11 points. Furthermore, these points are all
straightforward to write down explicitly in terms of the payoff matrix and the entries of p (see Eq. 6). The
feasible region of a reactive learning strategy, in terms of its boundary and extreme points, is evidently
more complicated in general.
Both memory-one and reactive learning strategies contain the set of all reactive strategies. For every
memory-one strategy, p, there exists a corresponding linear reactive learning strategy, p∗, and this corre-
spondence defines an injective map Mem1X → RLX . In general, however, p cannot be identified with its
image, p∗, unless p is reactive. We make this claim formally using the geometry of a strategy within the
feasible region, C (p), which captures all possible payoff pairs against an opponent. For any memory-one
strategy, we have C (p∗) ⊆ C (p). Therefore, reactive learning strategies generally allow a player to impose
greater control over where payoffs fall within the feasible region than do traditional memory-one strate-
gies. As illustrated in Fig. 5(a), this added control can prevent a greedy, self-payoff-maximizing opponent
from obtaining more than X when X uses p∗, even when such an opponent receives an unfair share of the
payoffs when X uses p instead. The proof of the containment C (p∗) ⊆ C (p) also extends to discounted
games, where each payoff unit received t rounds into the future is valued at δt units at present for some
“discounting factor,” δ ∈ [0, 1].
Another property of the map Mem1X → RLX sending p to p∗ is that it distorts the distribution of
payoffs within the feasible region. Since Mem1X can be identified with the space of linear reactive learning
strategies under this map, it is natural to compare the region of possible payoffs when p plays against
memory-one strategies to the one obtained from when p∗ plays against linear reactive learning strategies.
These distortions, as illustrated in Fig. 6, are particularly relevant when X plays against an opponent who
is using a process such as simulated annealing to optimize payoff. One can see from this example that if
Y initially has a low payoff, then with localized strategy exploration they must be willing to accept lower
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Figure 5. Simulated payoffs against a fixed memory-one strategy, p (grey), and its corresponding
reactive learning strategy, p∗ (green), as the opponent plays 105 randomly-chosen strategies q ∈
Mem1X . (a) If the opponent is greedy and wishes to optimize his or her own payoff only, then
upon exploring the space Mem1X for sufficiently long, the payoffs will end up at the black point
when X uses p and at the magenta point when X uses p∗. In this scenario, p favors Y having
a higher payoff than X, while p∗ favors X having a higher payoff than Y. Thus, p∗ extorts a
payoff-maximizing opponent while p is more generous. (b) The payoffs against p∗ (green) can fall
along a line even when those against p (grey) form a two-dimensional region. In (c), by using p∗
instead of p, X can limit the payoff the opponent receives from the black point to the magenta
point. Similarly, in (d), X can limit the potential “punishment” incurred from Y. When X uses p,
the opponent can choose a strategy that gives X a negative payoff (black point). When X uses p∗,
no such strategy of the opponent exists, and the worst payoff X can possibly receive is positive
(magenta point). The parameters used are (a) p = (0.90, 0.50, 0.01, 0.20, 0.90) and R = 2, S = −1,
T = 1, and P = 1/2; (b) p = (1.0000, 0.6946, 0.0354, 0.1168, 0.3889) and R = 3, S = 1, T = 2, and
P = 0; (c) p = (0.8623, 0.6182, 0.9528, 0.5601, 0.0001) and R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1; and
(d) p = (0.5626, 0.2381, 0.7236, 0.9537, 0.1496) and R = 1/2, S = −3/2, T = 2, and P = 3/2. Each
coordinate of q is chosen independently from an arcsine (i.e. Beta (1/2, 1/2)) distribution.
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Figure 6. Distortions in the distribution of payoffs against reactive learning strategies. In both
panels, the grey region is formed by playing 105 randomly-chosen strategies q ∈ Mem1X against a
fixed strategy p ∈ Mem1X . The green region in (a) arises from simulating the payoffs of p∗ against
105 strategies q ∈ Mem1X . In (b), this same reactive learning strategy, p∗, is simulated against 105
strategies q∗ ∈ RLX for q ∈ Mem1X . In both panels, the optimal outcome for Y is the black point
when X uses p and the magenta point when X uses p∗. The magenta point represents a much
better outcome for X and only a slightly worse outcome for Y than the black point, indicating that
p∗ is highly extortionate relative to p when played against a payoff-maximizing opponent. In both
panels, the parameters are p = (0.50, 0.99, 0.40, 0.01, 0.01) and R = 3, S = 0, T = 5, and P = 1. Each
coordinate of q is chosen independently from an arcsine (i.e. Beta (1/2, 1/2)) distribution.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
(a) (b)
update step update step
pa
yo
ff
pa
yo
ff!" !"
! plays #∗! plays #
Figure 7. Optimization against a memory-one strategy, (a), and the corresponding reactive learn-
ing strategy, (b). In each panel, X’s strategy is fixed with parameters p = (0.50, 0.99, 0.40, 0.01, 0.01).
Y chooses an initial memory-one strategy, q, from an arcsine distribution. At each update step,
Y samples another strategy, q′, from the same distribution. If Y’s payoff for playing q′ against X
exceeds that of playing q against X, then Y replaces his or her current strategy with q′. Otherwise,
q′ is discarded and Y retains q. Over time, this process generates a sequence of payoff pairs for X
and Y, shown in (a) and (b). Relative to p, the reactive learning strategy p∗ is highly extortionate.
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payoffs before they find a strategy that improves their initial payoff. This concern is not relevant when Y
can simply compute the best response to X’s strategy, but it is highly pertinent to evolutionary settings in
which the opponent’s strategy is obtained through mutation and selection rather than “computation.”
Reactive learning strategies are also more intuitive than memory-one strategies in some ways. Rather
than being a dictionary of mixed actions based on all possible observed outcomes, a reactive learning
strategy is simply an algorithm for updating one’s tendency to choose a certain action. It therefore allows
a player to alter their behavior (mixed action) over time in response to various stimuli (actions of the
opponent). This strategic approach to iterated games is reminiscent of both the Bush-Mosteller model [19]
and the weighted majority algorithm [24], although traditionally these models are not studied through the
payoff regions they generate in iterated games. There are several interesting directions for future research
in this area. For one, we have mainly considered the space of linear reactive learning strategies, but the
space RLX is much larger and could potentially exhibit complicated evolutionary dynamics. Furthermore,
one could relax the condition that these strategies be reactive and allow them to use X’s realized action
in addition to X’s mixed action. But even without these complications, we have seen that linear reactive
learning strategies have quite interesting relationships to traditional memory-one strategies.
Appendix. Convergence of mixed actions
Suppose that X and Y use strategies (p0, p∗) and (q0, q∗), respectively. Let σ0X = p0 and σ
0
Y = q0 be the
initial distributions on {C, D} for X and Y, respectively. If these distributions are known at time t > 0,
then, on average, the corresponding distributions at time t + 1 are given by the system of equations,
σt+1X := σ
t
Y p
∗
σtXC
+
(
1− σtY
)
p∗
σtX D
; (A1a)
σt+1Y := σ
t
Xq
∗
σtYC
+
(
1− σtX
)
q∗
σtY D
. (A1b)
This system suggests a fixed-point analysis to determine whether the sequence
{(
σtX , σ
t
Y
)}
t>0 converges.
Suppose that (σX , σY) ∈ [0, 1]2 is a fixed point of this system, i.e.
σX = σY p∗σXC + (1− σY) p∗σX D; (A2a)
σY = σXq∗σYC + (1− σX) q∗σY D. (A2b)
We consider this system for two types of linear reactive learning strategies: those coming from reactive
strategies and those coming from general memory-one strategies under the map Mem1X → RLX .
We first consider reactive strategies of the form (pC, pD), where pC (resp. pD) is the probability a player
uses C after the opponent played C (resp. D). Let (pC, pD) and (qC, qD) be fixed strategies for X and Y.
For these reactive strategies, the system Eq. A1 takes the form
σt+1X := σ
t
Y pC +
(
1− σtY
)
pD; (A3a)
σt+1Y := σ
t
XqC +
(
1− σtX
)
qD. (A3b)
One can easily check that this dynamical system has a unique fixed point, which Hofbauer and Sigmund
[23] refer to as the “asymptotic C-level” of (pC, pD) against (qC, qD), and which is given explicitly by
σX =
pCqD + pD (1− qD)
1− (pC − pD) (qC − qD) ; (A4a)
σY =
pDqC + (1− pD) qD
1− (pC − pD) (qC − qD) . (A4b)
Furthermore, we have the following, straightforward convergence result:
Proposition 2. If (pC, pD) , (qC, qD) ∈ (0, 1)2, and if (σX , σY) ∈ (0, 1)2 is given by Eq. A4, then
lim
t→∞
(
σtX , σ
t
Y
)
= (σX , σY) (A5)
for any initial condition, (p0, q0) ∈ [0, 1]2.
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Proof. For (pC, pD) , (qC, qD) ∈ (0, 1)2, consider the map
f : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1]2
:
(
x
y
)
7−→
(
ypC + (1− y) pD
xqC + (1− x) qD
)
. (A6)
For (x, y) , (x′, y′) ∈ [0, 1]2, we have
f (x, y)− f (x′, y′) = ((y− y′) (pC − pD)
(x− x′) (qC − qD)
)
. (A7)
It follows that ‖ f (x, y)− f (x′, y′)‖ 6 λ ‖(x, y)− (x′, y′)‖, where λ := max {|pC − pD| , |qC − qD|} < 1. By
the contraction mapping theorem, there is then a unique fixed point (σX , σY) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that
lim
t→∞ f
t (p0, q0) = (σX , σY) (A8)
for any (p0, q0) ∈ [0, 1]2. It is straightforward to check that Eq. A4 is a fixed point of Eq. A3. 
In particular, if µ := (σXσY, σX (1− σY) , (1− σX) σY, (1− σX) (1− σY)), then a straightforward calcula-
tion shows that µ is the stationary distribution of M ((pC, pD, pC, pD) , (qC, qD, qC, qD)) (Eq. 2).
Remark 4. Proposition 2 need not hold if py and qx are not strictly between 0 and 1. For example, when
X and Y both play TFT, f is a simple involution with f (x, y) = (y, x), which preserves distance.
Consider now the case of general memory-one strategies with p•• := (pCC, pCD, pDC, pDD) for X and
q•• := (qCC, qCD, qDC, qDD) for Y. For these strategies, the system defined by Eq. A1 has the form
σt+1X := σ
t
Y
(
σtX pCC +
(
1− σtX
)
pDC
)
+
(
1− σtY
) (
σtX pCD +
(
1− σtX
)
pDD
)
; (A9a)
σt+1Y := σ
t
X
(
σtYqCC +
(
1− σtY
)
qDC
)
+
(
1− σtX
) (
σtYqCD +
(
1− σtY
)
qDD
)
. (A9b)
In the spirit of Proposition 2, for fixed p••,q•• ∈ (0, 1)4, we could consider the map
F : [0, 1]2 −→ [0, 1]2
:
(
x
y
)
7−→
(
y (xpCC + (1− x) pDC) + (1− y) (xpCD + (1− x) pDD)
x (yqCC + (1− y) qDC) + (1− x) (yqCD + (1− y) qDD)
)
(A10)
and analyze its fixed points. At this point, however, a couple of remarks are in order:
(i) F need not be a contraction, even when p•• and q•• have entries strictly between 0 and 1. For
example, with p•• = (0.9566, 0.2730, 0.0056, 0.0095) and q•• = (0.9922, 0.0918, 0.3217, 0.0054),
0.0441 = ‖F (0.7404, 0.6928)− F (0.8241, 0.8280)‖
> ‖(0.7404, 0.6928)− (0.8241, 0.8280)‖ = 0.0253. (A11)
We would conjecture that this map is an eventual contraction, in which case the convergence result
of Proposition 2 still holds (although the explicit formulas for σX and σY differ from Eq. A4).
(ii) a fixed point of F, (σX , σY), even when it exists and is unique, generally does not have the property
that µ (p,q) = (σXσY, σX (1− σY) , (1− σX) σY, (1− σX) (1− σY)), where µ is the stationary distri-
bution of Eq. 2. Furthermore, the long-run mean-frequency distribution on {C, D}2 can be distinct
from both of these distributions, including when the opponent plays q against p∗ and when they
play q∗ against p∗. An example of when these four distributions are pairwise distinct is easy
to write down, e.g. p = (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.99, 0.01) and q = (0.99, 0.99, 0.01, 0.99, 0.99). All four
distributions coincide when p and q are both reactive, but in general they can be distinct.
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